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Abstract 
This paper explores the earnings return to Catalan knowledge for public and private workers in Cat­
alonia. In doing so, we allow for a double simultaneous selection process. We consider, on the one 
hand, the non­random allocation of workers into one sector or another, and on the other, the potential 
self­selection into Catalan proficiency. In addition, when correcting the earnings equations, we control 
for the correlation between the two selectivity rules. Our findings suggest that the apparent higher lan­
guage return for public sector workers is entirely accounted for by selection effects, whereas knowl­
edge of Catalan has a significant positive return in the private sector, which is somewhat higher when 
the selection processes are taken into account. 
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1. Introduction 
The period of democracy in Spain, which started with the end of the dictatorship (1939­
1975), has been characterized by large­scale regional devolution. The economic, legal and po­
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litical decentralization has brought with it a significant degree of independence from the State, 
especially for regions such as Catalonia. An additional feature of the democratization process 
is the general expansion of the Welfare State, which has led to a huge increase in public sec­
tor employment. In Catalonia, the combination of these two factors has meant a great expan­
sion of local government in the last thirty years, which has progressively gained importance 
with respect to some of the existing centralized institutions. Another important aspect of the 
democratization process is the recognition of regional culture and language, which were se­
verely repressed during the dictatorship (the Franco regime had prohibited the use of Catalan 
in public and strongly disapproved of its use in private). In the case of Catalonia, this “cultur­
al devolution” has been spearheaded by two major public linguistic policies aimed at promot­
ing and enhancing the use of the Catalan language among the population. 
Specifically, the first linguistic policy implemented by Catalonia’s Autonomous Gov­
ernment (the Generalitat) was the “Linguistic Normalization Act” of 1983 (Llei de Normal-
ització Lingüística), which aimed to reinstate the public use of Catalan and to stimulate its 
learning and its use in private. This law established not only that Catalan was to be the offi­
cial language of the Catalan government and of local public administrations, but also the 
main language used in primary and secondary education1. In order to stimulate and improve 
private study, the Generalitat also began to organize language courses directed to the adult 
population, usually offered completely free of charge. More relevant today for the econom­
ic value of knowledge of Catalan was the “Linguistic Policy Act” of 1998 (Llei de Política 
Lingüística), which attempted to reassert the presence of Catalan (versus Castilian) by a) in­
creasing fluency requirements for public sector employees, and b) introducing major incen­
tives (and in some case requirements) for increasing the use of Catalan in private business 
and other socioeconomic and cultural domains2 (Solé and Alarcón 2001). 
These two public policies have increased the economic value of knowledge of Catalan 
in the local labour market, to the extent that proficiency in the language is believed to be very 
important today. In fact, using Census data of 1991 and 1996 (that is, even before the imple­
mentation of the linguistic reform of 1998), Rendon (2007) shows that knowledge of Cata­
lan has a substantial impact on the probability of employment among native­born individu­
als and immigrants from the rest of Spain. Moreover, Quella and Rendon (2009) suggest that 
the skills of speaking and writing Catalan have a significant effect on employment prospects, 
especially in white­collar occupations, services, government and education. Finally, a recent 
study by Di Paolo and Raymond (2010) stresses the existence of significant earnings returns 
to Catalan proficiency (defined as the ability to speak and write in Catalan) among first­ and 
second generation immigrants in Catalonia. In general, the potential return to Catalan profi­
ciency exists because, in spite of the efforts at institutional level to raise Catalan fluency 
among the population, full functional knowledge is far from widespread. 
This study attempts to make another step forward, by simultaneously considering the 
role of knowledge of Catalan in sector choice and the relationship between language profi­
ciency and monthly earnings. Applying a level of detail that goes beyond our previous study, 
the general aim of this paper is to determine whether there is an earnings/productivity effect 
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of the knowledge of Catalan, distinguishing between the public and the private sectors. With 
the objective of providing evidences that are consistent for the whole employed population, 
we also aim to establish whether the statistical association between knowledge of Catalan 
and earnings in the two sectors is affected by the potential relationship between language 
proficiency and private/public sector selection. In other words, we want to examine whether 
knowledge of Catalan is considered an “advantage” in the two sectors (and consequently in­
creases an individual’s earnings), or whether it merely represents a “requirement” for work­
ing in the Catalan public sector. We hypothesize that with the strict regulations imposed by 
the legislation on language mentioned above, and the progressive contraction of public insti­
tutions of the State (which are not regulated by the regional legislation), Catalan proficien­
cy will emerge as a prerequisite to enter the public sector, and may represent an advantage 
in the private sector. 
With these purposes in mind, this paper proceeds as follows. The next section offers a 
brief review of the relevant literature and situates the study; section 3 presents the data used 
in the empirical analysis and some descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the economet­
ric methodology for dealing with this particular issue; section 5 contains the empirical re­
sults, and section 6 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
This paper is based on two main groups of previous research. The first is the vast recent 
literature on the economic return to language proficiency (see Chiswick and Miller 2007 and 
Chiswick 2008 for a comprehensive overview). In general, this literature highlights two well­
established findings. On the one hand, language proficiency is in general associated with 
higher earnings among the immigrant population, and language deficiencies explain a signif­
icant part of the migrants’ earnings gap with respect to the native population. On the other, 
the statistical association between individual labour market outcomes and language proficien­
cy is likely to be biased by unobserved individual heterogeneity3, which requires the imple­
mentation of more sophisticated econometric techniques than a simple OLS estimation, in­
cluding Instrumental Variables, Self­Selection models, Statistical Matching, Differentiation 
with Panel Data, depending on data availability. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in gen­
eral, the literature about the economic value of language knowledge is mainly concerned with 
immigrants who acquire some proficiency in the language of the host country. However, for 
several reasons explained above, the issue of the return to the knowledge of Catalan might 
also be relevant for native­born individuals (as also suggested by Rendón 2007). Therefore, it 
seems worth referring to the research concerning the wage premium for being proficient in 
second (foreign) languages among native workers. For example, using the European Commu­
nity Household Panel Survey, Ginsburgh and Prieto­Rodríguez (2007, 2011) found a positive 
return to being proficient in languages that are used at the workplace4. As usual, they obtain 
higher returns when the endogeneity on language proficiency is accounted for; moreover, 
using an IV Quintile Regression strategy, they suggest that the return to foreign language 
knowledge is higher at the higher quintiles of the conditional wage distribution. 
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In any case, it seems that the relationship etween language proficiency and earnings 
cannot be considered in isolation from occupation­/sector choice­related decisions. In 
fact, the papers by Berman et al. (2003) and Lang and Siniver (2009), based on panel 
data, suggest that knowing Hebrew in Israel has a positive value only in high­skill oc­
cupations, and that the apparent language return for low­skilled workers is due entirely 
to unobserved heterogeneity (ruled out by taking the first difference from the longitudi­
nal estimates). However, neither of these papers explicitly considers that occupation is 
the intervening activity that links income to education and the other forms of Human 
Capital –including language proficiency. This would mean that language knowledge 
may play an important role in determining the type of occupation the individual can 
enter; therefore, more fluent individuals would tend to be self­selected into occupations 
with higher language requirements. This possibility has been explicitly considered in a 
recent paper by Chiswick and Miller (2010), who exploited the O*NET database that 
contains information on occupation­specific language requirements in the US. The au­
thors find a positive sorting of more proficient workers into occupations that require a 
higher level of language fluency; moreover, they argue that the positive effect of lan­
guage proficiency is higher the higher the level of English required in the occupation. 
Finally, Aldashev et al. (2009) explore the effect of language knowledge on immigrants’ 
earnings in Germany, considering the potential effect of language fluency on the simul­
taneous selection process into economic sector and occupation type. After estimating a 
two­step model with multiple simultaneous sources of selection, they find that when the 
positive effect of language proficiency in the simultaneous selection of economic sector 
and occupation type is taken into account, there is no evidence to suggest a pure produc­
tivity language effect. In other words, it seems that the earnings return to language 
knowledge is only indirect, because more proficient workers are more likely to be se­
lected into high­paid works. 
As briefly mentioned above, in this paper we investigate the potential earnings return to 
proficiency Catalan in the public and private sectors. Given the strict regulation of language 
requirements in public sector occupations, we suspect that the economic value of knowledge 
of Catalan may differ radically between these domains. Nevertheless, we believe that, in the 
case of Catalonia, language proficiency and the public/private sector choice can be taken as 
a joint simultaneous decision, and that this simultaneity must be taken into account in order 
to obtain a correct estimate of the earnings return to Catalan in the two sectors. Therefore, 
as references we also take some of the studies of the earning differentials across the public 
and private sectors. 
In particular, we refer to studies that consider the existence of a potential selectivity 
process behind the sector choice decision, which is taken into account in the estimation of 
earning determinants for predicting earning differentials in the two sectors –normally using 
Endogenous Switching Models (see van der Gaag and Vijverberg 1988, Hartog and Oost­
erbeek 1993, Dustman and van Soest 1998, Adamchik and Bedi 2000, Bender (2003) 
among others). We also refer to two other studies that consider the existence of other 
sources of selection apart from the public/private sector choice, which are treated in much 
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the same way as in Aldashev et al. (2009). Specifically, the paper by Christofides and 
Pashardes (2002) takes into account the existence of a double selection problem in the 
choice between self­ and paid­employment and public/private sector selection. Neverthe­
less, their results indicate that these two underlying choices are not interrelated, and they 
eventually estimate the wage equations controlling for two independent selection correction 
terms– one for the type of employment and the other for the desired sector. Moreover, Heit­
mueller (2006) treats labour force participation and sector choice as simultaneous deci­
sions, and he takes account of this potential double selection mechanism for computing the 
earning gap between public and private sector employees. Finally, Recotillet (2007) esti­
mates the return of participating in a post­doctoral training for French doctors who work in 
the private sector, which seems to be positive when estimated by simple OLS. However, 
once controlling for the simultaneous selectivity of the participation in a post­doctoral pro­
gramme and the sector choice, she finds that the post­doctoral programme has no effect on 
earnings. 
Following these two strands of the literature, we start by modelling a Bivariate Probit 
Equation to explain, on the one hand the propensity to be proficient in Catalan or not, and 
on the other hand the decision to work in the public or the private sector. Subsequently, as 
explained in detail in what follows, from this bivariate estimation we construct two selectiv­
ity correction terms –one for sector choice and the other for knowledge of Catalan respec­
tively– that take into account the simultaneity of the two self­selection mechanisms when es­
timating the earnings equations. In general, the inclusion of the correction terms would 
adjust the biases in the estimates caused by the non­random assignment of workers in the 
economic sectors, and by the potential self­selection into knowledge of Catalan. However, 
if the likelihood of working in one sector or the other and the propensity to be fluent in Cata­
lan are interrelated variables (this is a realistic possibility in the case of Catalonia), neglect­
ing this simultaneity would lead to inconsistent estimates of the economic value of knowl­
edge of Catalan in the two sectors. 
As illustrated below, the empirical results indicate that the two selection processes are 
positively related, and this relationship must be taken into account for a correct estimation 
of the economic value of knowledge of Catalan in the public and private sectors. Moreover, 
the results indicate that the apparently higher return to knowledge of Catalan in the public 
sector estimated by a simple regression is accounted for entirely by the fact that proficient 
workers are more likely to be selected into the public sector (and vice versa). In contrast, 
there exists a significant return to proficiency in Catalan for individuals who work in the pri­
vate sector, which is significantly higher when selection into language knowledge and eco­
nomic sector is accounted for. This empirical evidence could be taken as an indication that 
the economic value of Catalan proficiency for public sector workers is only represented by 
a higher chance of working in this sector, but (once entered) language knowledge will have 
little effect on improving earning opportunities5 –i.e. knowledge of Catalan is merely an 
entry requirement. However, in the absence of a strict regulation regarding language capa­
bilities in the private sector, fluency in Catalan may represent an advantage for proficient 
(private) workers, which is reflected by higher expected monthly earnings. 
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3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis is based on the data from the 2006 “Survey of Living Conditions 
and Habits of the Catalan Population (ECVHP06)” carried out by the Statistical Institute of 
Catalonia (IDESCAT). The original sample comprises 10,358 observations of individuals 
aged 16 or more residing in Catalonia. The survey aims to obtain socioeconomic and demo­
graphic information of the overall population, focusing on individuals and their families. The 
data were collected between the fourth trimester of 2005 and the third trimester of 2006; 
therefore, the information on individual labour market status and monthly earnings reflects 
the situation in 2005­2006. Analyzing this period is very attractive for our purposes, since 
the unemployment rate was exceptionally low (6.6%)6; this means that we can focus only on 
the employed population, as we consider that neglecting the potential self­selection into em­
ployment would not be problematic during this period7. Moreover, the relatively high rate of 
female activity (52.3%) allowed us to include women in the analysis. This means that, as 
commented above, our final aim is to provide evidences that are consistent for the employed 
population in 2005­2006. 
The final sample consisted in 5,019 observations of all the individuals aged 16 to 65 in 
regular employment, with valid information on earnings (net of taxes), which are recorded 
in brackets. Notice that the interval­coding of monthly earnings is the most important limi­
tation of the ECVHP06 database; in fact, it makes unfeasible the construction of an hourly 
wage measure, which represents the standard dependent variable in a Mincer­type regres­
sion. Therefore, we are forced to limit the analysis to monthly earnings, but we address this 
issue in the Robustness Checks section (5.4). Anyway, the ECVHP06 represents the unique 
database that enables the analysis of the earnings returns to Catalan knowledge, because it 
contains the information about language skills and several potential instruments for dealing 
with its endogeneity in the earnings equation8. 
The information on Catalan knowledge contained in the survey is reported in four cate­
gories: namely, an individual may claim he/she “does not understand”, “understand but is 
unable to speak”, “is able to speak but not to write”, and “is able to speak and write” Cata­
lan. Only individuals who could speak and write Catalan were considered fully proficient. 
This restrictive definition of language proficiency might help to minimize the potential 
measurement error in the self­reported language knowledge variable9. Table 1 contains a 
basic description of the selected sample, in terms of the two relevant dimensions of analysis 
–i.e. proficiency in Catalan and economic sector. Specifically, each cell of this 2×2 table 
contains the expected frequencies of every possible outcome, and the row­percentages in 
italics inside brackets. 
Slightly more than 16% of the selected sample work in the public sector, and 83% of 
them are fully proficient in Catalan. In all likelihood, the remaining 17% comprise individ­
uals who work in the institutions of the central government, where knowledge of Catalan is 
not strictly considered a requirement. In the private sector, which represents 83% of the final 
sample, the proportion of fully proficient workers falls to 61%, reflecting the lack of any 
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strict public regulation concerning knowledge of Catalan in this sector. These differences in 
the distribution of language capital in the Catalan labour market may be reflected in differ­
ent rates of return to language knowledge in the two sectors. 
Table 1
 
EXPECTED FREQUENCIES ACCORDING TO PROFICIENCY IN CATALAN
 
AND PUBLIC­PRIVATE SECTOR
 
Catalan proficiency 
Yes No Total 
Economic sector 
Total 
Public 
Private 
688 
(–83%) 
2.542 
(–61%) 
3.230 
141 
(–17%) 
1.648 
(–39%) 
1.789 
829 
(–100%) 
4.190 
(–100%) 
5.019 
Proficiency: ability to speak and write Catalan. 
Source: ECVHP06, our own calculations. 
Given that knowledge of Catalan is significantly more widespread in the public than 
in the private sector, one might expect to observe higher return among private sector 
workers. Table 2 illustrates the means of log earnings10 in the two sectors according to 
Catalan proficiency. This descriptive evidence is the exact opposite of what we might 
have expected. 
Table 2
 
MEANS AND EQUALITY TESTS FOR MONTHLY EARNINGS BY ECONOMIC SECTOR
 
AND LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE
 
Expected log­monthly 
earnings 
Economic sector 
Public Private 
Difference in 
mean t­Statistics 
Total sample 
Proficient 
Not proficient 
Difference in mean t­statistic 
7,15 
(–0,016) 
7,19 
(–0,017) 
6,99 
(–0,04) 
4,52 
6,93 
(–0,07) 
6,97 
(–0,009) 
6,88 
(–0,011) 
6,34 
9,29 
8,01 
2,18 
Note: Interval regression estimates. Robust standard errors in italics. 
As commonly reported in the literature, public sector workers earn significantly more 
than those in the private sector and the positive statistical association between monthly earn­
ings and language proficiency is also higher in the former (0.20 log points). Moreover, the 
positive earnings premium in the public sector is significantly more pronounced among pro­
ficient workers11. Nevertheless, the interest lies in the ceteris-paribus earnings return to 
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knowledge of Catalan, unaffected by the potential mechanisms of self­selection behind this 
estimation (see the next section for details). 
Therefore, in order to model monthly earnings, knowledge of Catalan and sector choice, 
we exploit all the relevant information contained in the ECVHP06 database12. Table 2A in 
the Appendix contains the basic descriptive statistics separately for public and private work­
ers. The sub­sample of public sector workers is somewhat older, highly feminized, and bet­
ter educated than the sub­sample of private sector workers. As expected, there is a higher 
presence of foreign workers in the private sector. Moreover, public sector workplaces are 
more stable, given the higher job tenure and the higher unionization rate; finally, the propor­
tion of part­time workers is almost the same in both sectors. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
We start by estimating two log­earning regressions: one for private sector employees 
(PUBi=0) and one for public sector employees (PUBi=1); the d coefficients in (1) represent 
our parameters of interest, which capture the percentage earnings increase associated with 
Catalan knowledge (CATi = 1 if the individual is proficient in Catalan, 0 otherwise). 
ln Yi,PUB0 = aPUB0 + X’ibPUB0 + CATidPUB0 + ePUB0 if PUBi = 0 [1] ln Yi,PUB1 = aPUB1 + X’ibPUB1 + CATidPUB1 + ePUB1 if PUBi = 0 
A selectivity problem arises when the likelihood of entering the public sector and/or the 
propensity to achieve full language proficiency depend on unobservable individual charac­
teristics that are potentially related to the unobservable earnings determinants. The two se­
lection processes can be treated with the standard methods proposed by Lee (1978) and 
Heckman (1979), but only if the two selection rules are strictly independent. 
However, in our case, the selection rules –i.e. public/private sector choice and proficien­
cy in Catalan– are clearly unlikely to be independent. In fact, because of the Catalan institu­
tional setting those who work in the public sector are, in general, more likely to know Cata­
lan, and those who are fully proficient in Catalan may be more likely to work in the public 
sector13. This means that we must deal with a joint double selection rule, which can be writ­
ten as 
CAT*i = Z’i g + ui [2a] 
PUB*i = W’iy + wi [2b] 
with var (ui) = var (wi) = 1; cov (ui, wi) = corr (ui, wi) = ru,w, 
where Zi and Wi contain the observable determinants of the latent propensity to know Cata­
lan (CAT*) and of the desired sector choice (PUB*) respectively, and ru,w represents the cor­
relation coefficient between the unobservable elements of the two equations. If this correla­
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tion coefficient is statistically different from zero, we must generalize the selectivity prob­
lems to a double simultaneous selection process, which can be addressed with the method­
ology proposed by Fishe et al. (1981), Ham (1982) and Tunali (1986), and more recently 
used by Heitmueller (2006), Recotillet, (2007) and by Aldashev et al. (2009) among others. 
Specifically, taking expectation of the earnings equations in (1) we obtain that, 
E[lnYi,PUB0 | Xi,PUBi = 0, CATi] = aPUB0 + X’ibPUB0 + CATidPUB0 + E[ePUB0 | Xi, PUBi = 0, CATi] [3]
E[lnYi,PUB1 | Xi,PUBi = 1, CATi] = aPUB1 + X’ibPUB1 + CATidPUB1 + E[ePUB1 | Xi, PUBi = 1, CATi] 
where the last terms in both equations contain the joint double selectivity bias; following the 
two­step procedure proposed by Tunali (1986), we consider this generalized selectivity 
problem as a double simultaneous selection situation, with full information on the outcomes 
of the two selection rules (giving four distinct cells). That is, as shown in the descriptive 
analysis, the sample contains cases of proficient individuals in either the public or the pri­
vate sector. Moreover, there are also public sector employees who are not proficient in Cata­
lan, the ones who work in the central government’s institutions –that do not consider knowl­
edge of Catalan as a strict requirement for workers. Finally, we obviously observe private 
sector employees who do not know Catalan, given the absence of a general legal requirement 
regarding knowledge of Catalan, and the co­existence with Spanish. In addition, we may also 
reasonably assume that the two selection rules are simultaneous (rather than sequential), 
given that during the “linguistic normalization” process, public sector workers with limited 
knowledge of Catalan were allowed to improve their proficiency by attending specific lan­
guage courses for public­employees, provided free of charge by the Catalan government 
(and normally taught during part of the working day). 
Therefore, Tunali (1986) shows that, assuming a joint normal distribution of the error 
terms (ej, u, w) with zero mean and variance­covariance matrix14 
2
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and F(·) stands for the Bivariate Normal Distribution of the predicted probabilities comput­
ed from the joint estimation of (2a) and (2b) with a Bivariate Probit model. This means that 
the conditional expected earnings in (3) can be written as 
E[lnYi,PUB0 | Xi,PUBi = 0,CATi]=aPUB0+X’i bPUB0+CATidPUB0+se0re0uli,PUB+se0re0wli,CAT [7] E[lnYi,PUB1 | Xi,PUBi = 1,CATi]=aPUB1+X’i bPUB1+CATidPUB1+se1re1uli,PUB+se1re1wli,CAT 
where lPUB and lCAT represent two additional variables that must be included in the earnings 
equation for the two sectors, in order to correct the estimation of the parameters of interest 
(the d coefficients) for the potential bias caused by the double simultaneous selectivity prob­
lem described above. Note that if the correlation between the error terms of the two selec­
tion rules ru,w is equal to zero, the l terms reduce to two independent correction terms, as in 
Heckman’s standard method. On the other hand, if ru,w ≠ 0, neglecting the statistical rela­
tionship between the selection rules would still lead to inconsistent estimates. 
4.1. Identification 
In general, standard selectivity models à la Heckman require the presence of at least 
one exclusion restriction to ensure that the parameters are identified not only because of 
the non­linearity of the selectivity­correction term. This means that at least one variable 
that appears in the selection equation can be reasonably assumed to be excludable from 
the outcome equation(s) of the second stage. However, as pointed out by Tunali (1986, 
pp. 245), the bivariate selectivity model requires additional exclusion restrictions for 
identifying the correlation coefficient parameter of the error term of the simultaneous 
selection equations. That is, at least one determinant of each selection process must not 
be related with the unexplained earnings component. Moreover, for complete identifica­
tion at least one variable included in the sector choice equation must not influence Cata­
lan knowledge and vice versa, and this variable must not appear in the earnings equa­
tions. 
In the case of the Catalan proficiency equation, like Rendon (2007) we assume that hav­
ing received schooling in Catalan (i.e. after the 1983 reform) affects knowledge of Catalan 
but does not directly affect individual earnings. We also assume that after controlling for the 
years since migration in the earnings equations, having arrived at the age of 10 or younger 
only affects individual’s earnings through Catalan proficiency. Moreover, we consider that 
language use with the children acts as a determinant of language proficiency and can be ex­
cluded from the earnings equation. Finally, regional origins of national immigrants only ap­
pear in the Catalan knowledge equation. 
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In order to identify the sector choice equation, we consider that father’s occupation in­
fluences sector choice but does not directly affect individual earnings (following Dustmann 
and van Soest 1998). Moreover, in accordance with Christofides and Pashardes (2002), the 
sector choice equation contains a variable indicating whether the individual’s spouse or 
partner is an employer (capturing a potential reduction in the cost of job­search in the pri­
vate sector), and another variable indicating whether the individual perceives income from 
other sources (non­labour income). The number of children is assumed to influence only 
sector choice, and does not directly affect earnings. In order to reinforce identification, 
years of completed schooling are included in the knowledge of Catalan and earnings equa­
tions, but completed education is included as a dummy variable in the sector choice equa­
tion (Hartog and Oosterbeek 1993, among others, adopt a similar strategy). This reflects 
that earnings and language knowledge depend on the length of completed studies (human 
capital view), whereas the sector choice decision is more closely related to the legal value 
of educational certificates. Moreover, following the same logic, we also assume that the 
type of University studies only affects the decision to enter the public sector (and does not 
directly affect earnings). 
5. Results 
5.1. Baseline Earnings Equations 
The analysis of the empirical results starts with the estimation of (1) without accounting 
for selection15, whose estimates are reported in table 3; the high R2 indicates that the covari­
ates included have satisfactory power for explaining the log of monthly earnings. Compar­
ing the estimates across the two sectors we observe that native­born individuals of Catalan 
origin (i.e. with at least one parent born in Catalonia) earn somewhat less than second­gen­
eration immigrants in the private sector; moreover, immigrants from elsewhere in Spain 
present a clear earnings advantage in both sectors16. There is no clear penalization for Euro­
pean immigrants, whereas private sector workers proceeding from Africa, Asia and other 
countries earn significantly less than native­born immigrants, even accounting for Catalan 
knowledge. Immigrants who arrived many years ago are paid less than recent immigrants 
with similar characteristics, but only in the private sector. Females earn less than males, al­
though the earnings gap is somewhat lower in the public sector; and, as commonly found in 
the literature, married individuals tend to earn more than their unmarried counterparts. 
The return to one additional year of schooling is considerably higher in the public sec­
tor17, while an additional year of job tenure has practically the same impact on monthly earn­
ings in both sectors. Previous experience shows a positive linear effect on earnings in the 
public sector18 and an inverse U­shaped effect in the private sector. As expected, monthly 
earnings for part­time are almost the 40% lower than for full­time workers. Union members 
earn more than non­union members, and the earning effect of union membership is signifi­
cantly higher in the private sector. Among private workers, those who work in a large firm 
and those who are self­employed earn more than the mean. 
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Table 3
 
EARNING EQUATIONS (INTERVAL REGRESSION)
 
Dependent Variable: Public Private 
Ln(Earnings) – brackets sector sector 
Constant 6,079 6,289 
(–72,12) (–188,6) 
Proficiency in Catalan 0,089 0,049 
(–2,24) (–3,17) 
Native–(Catalan Origin) Ref. Cat. Ref. Cat. 
Native–(2nd gen Immigrant) –0,031 0,017 
(–1.07) (–1,23) 
Born in the rest of Spain 0,089 0,077 
(–1,73) (–2,7) 
Born in Europe –0,025 –0,005 
(–0.21) (–0.12) 
Born in Latin America –0,079 –0,04 
(–0.77) (–1.50) 
Born in Africa –0,176 –0,092 
(–2.14) (–3.08) 
Born in Asia or other countries 0,052 –0,092 
(–0,58) (–2.24) 
YMS/10 –0,003 –0,017 
(–0.31) (–3.21) 
Female –0,251 –0,288 
(–10.5) (–24.28) 
Married 0,053 0,077 
(–2,12) (–6,09) 
Years of Schooling 0,059 0,042 
(–14,96) (–22,3) 
Job Tenure (in months)/10 0,011 0,01 
(–10,44) (–14,67) 
(Previous) Experience/10 0,068 0,121 
(–3,75) (–6,94) 
Experience2/100 –0,02 – 
(–4.72) 
Part–time Worker –0,388 –0,438 
(–8.29) (–19,84) 
Union membership 0,077 0,09 
(–2,5) (–6,94) 
#Workers>500 0,053 – 
(–3,51) 
Self–Employed 0,109 – 
(–5,86) 
Living in Barcelona 0,023 0,02 
(–0,83) (–1,47) 
R2 0,52 0,44
 
Nº Observations 829 4,190
 
Note: Robust Standard Errors; z–Statistics in Parentheses. 
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Moreover, proficiency in Catalan has a significant and positive effect on monthly earn­
ings in both sectors and, consistent with the descriptive evidence presented above, the return 
to knowledge of Catalan seems to be higher in the public sector; indeed, point–estimates in­
dicate a 5% (= exp(d)–1) return in the private sector, whereas the language premium for pub­
lic workers is reflected in extra earnings of 9.4%. However, as noted above, these estimates 
may be seriously biased. One possible source of bias is the potential non–randomness of the 
mechanism that allocates workers in the public or the private sector. Unobserved individual 
heterogeneity may represent another source of bias, if individuals opt to learn Catalan on the 
basis of their unobservable attributes –potentially related to unexplained earnings compo­
nents. Finally, a third source of bias may be the correlation between the unobservable deter­
minants of the two selection mechanisms (Catalan proficiency and sector choice). 
5.2. Bivariate Selection Equations 
In order to deal with these multiple sources of bias, we implement the double simulta­
neous selection correction with the methodology presented in the previous section. The first 
step is the joint estimation of the selection equation (2a) and (2b) to explain Catalan profi­
ciency and sector choice respectively. Table 4 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of 
the resulting Bivariate Probit. 
The results of the estimation of the knowledge of Catalan equation indicate that females 
are somewhat more likely to speak and write Catalan than males with similar characteristics. 
As expected, the propensity to be proficient in Catalan decreases with age, indicating that 
older individuals have more difficulty in assimilating the language. Second–generation im­
migrants are clearly less likely to speak and write Catalan than native–born individuals of 
Catalan origin. Individuals born outside Catalonia are also clearly penalized, except for those 
from eastern Spain (Valencia and Balearic Islands); this result is no surprise, since Catalan 
is also spoken in these regions of Spain (even though it is less institutionalized). Moreover, 
the disadvantage is even higher for those individuals who were born outside Spain, especial­
ly for Latin American immigrants; in all likelihood, this is because their mother–tongue is 
Spanish, and the incentives for learning Catalan are lower for them (ceteris paribus). How­
ever, the positive and statistically significant coefficient for time in Catalonia (years since 
migration) indicates that a longer exposure to the local language favours its assimilation19. 
Schooling is clearly one of the most important determinants of the probability of speak­
ing and writing Catalan, with a positive and highly significant estimated coefficient. As 
found by Rendon (2007), linguistic assimilation is easier for immigrants who arrived at a 
young age (even controlling for the years since migration); moreover, individuals affected 
by the 1983 language legislation are more likely to be able to speak and write Catalan, with 
a stronger effect for those who were schooled entirely in Catalan after the 1983 reform. Our 
results also show that the individual’s environment plays an important role in explaining the 
chances of achieving language proficiency. In fact, use of the language with the children20 
significantly increases the probability of speaking and writing Catalan. 
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Table 4
 
BIVARIATE FIRST­STAGE ESTIMATION (CATALAN PROFICIENY/SECTOR CHOICE)
 
­ ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS
 
Dependent Variable: 
Being Proficient in Catalan (0­1) Coefficient z­Statistic 
Constant –0,73 –0,38 
Female 0,168 3,42 
Age/10 –0,235 –6,89 
Native–(Catalan Origin) ref. cat. – 
Native–(2nd gen Immigrant) –0,61 –10,02 
Born in Eastern Spain –0,351 –1,47 
Born in Southern Spain –1,43 –10,74 
Born in Central Spain –1,404 –10,72 
Born in North–Western Spain –1,184 –6,08 
Born in North–Eastern Spain –1,262 –6,96 
Born in Europe –2,181 –10,7 
Born in Africa –2,051 –12,29 
Born in Latin America –2,665 –17,35 
Born in Asia or other countries –2,406 –10,86 
YSM/10 (= 0 for Natives) 0,215 3,34 
(Born in Spain)×YSM –0,019 –2,84 
Years of Education 0,137 19,37 
Arrival at age 10 or younger 0,478 4,29 
Partial Normalization 0,584 7,25 
Complete Normalization 0,851 7,78 
Speaks Catalan with children 0,654 10,98 
Dependent Variable: 
Working in the public sector (0­1) Coefficient z­Statistic 
Constant ­2,832 -8,68 
Female 0,213 4,56 
Age/10 0,531 3,36 
Age2/100 ­0,049 -2,67 
Native­(Catalan Origin & 2nd gen Immigrant) ref. cat. – 
Born in the rest of Spain 0,017 0,27 
Born in Europe ­0,588 -2,81 
Born outside Europe ­0,535 -5,59 
No Education­Primary Education ref. cat. – 
Lower­Secondary Education ­0,029 -0,28 
Vocational Secondary Education 0,304 3,09 
General Upper­Secondary Education 0,336 3,31 
Tertiary Education 1,399 13,46 
University: Humanities ref. cat. – 
University: Exact Sciences ­0,667 -6,55 
University: Social Sciences ­0,632 -7,13 
Number of Children 0,023 0,92 
Partner is Employer ­0,325 -2,81 
Father Skilled White­Collar 0,174 2,2 
Father Skilled Blue­Collar 0,223 2,57 
Non­labour income 0,104 2,27 
ruw = 0.231; c2[H0: ruw = 0]= 33.14 (P-Value = 0.000) 
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The estimates of the sector choice equation reveal that females are significantly more 
likely to work in the public sector than males. As commonly found in the literature, the num­
ber of children does not significantly affect the probability of working in one sector or in the 
other. The likelihood of being selected in the public sector increases with age but at a de­
creasing rate; foreigners are less likely to enter the public sector, and those who were born 
in Europe are even less likely to do so than their non­European immigrants. 
Individuals with a post–compulsory education certificate have a higher chance of work­
ing in the public sector than individuals with lower­secondary education or less; among ter­
tiary educated workers, those who studied exact sciences or social sciences at University are 
significantly less likely to work in the public sector than those who studied humanities. As 
expected, the relative cost of searching for a public sector job is higher for those individuals 
whose partner is an employer; moreover, being the child of a skilled white­collar or skilled 
blue­collar father increases the likelihood of having a public occupation. Surprisingly, those 
individuals who have some non­labour income are more likely to work in the public sector. 
Finally, the correlation coefficient r is positive and statistically different from zero, uw 
which means that the two selection rules are not independent. Specifically, this result indi­
cates that individuals who are more likely to be proficient in Catalan are also more likely to 
work in the public sector and vice versa; notice that in this Bivariate Probit model the posi­
tive relationship between the two selectivity mechanisms is indirect –i.e. it is captured by the 
correlation between the unobservable of the two equations. The evidence of significant cor­
relation between the disturbances of the selection equations also suggests that joint estima­
tion provides more efficient results than independent estimation of the two selection rules. 
In addition, it implies that this correlation should be taken into account in order to obtain a 
consistent estimate of the return to knowledge of Catalan in each sector, because controlling 
for the two selectivity rules assuming that they are independent may not entirely eliminate 
selection bias(es). 
5.3. Selectivity­Corrected Earnings Equations 
As noted above, the previous estimation of the language return in the private and public 
sectors could be biased on the one hand by the non­randomness of the allocation of workers 
into one sector or another, and on the other hand by the self­selection into knowledge of 
Catalan. We should also take into account the positive correlation between these two selec­
tivity rules, as suggested by the previous results. In order to obtain a consistent estimate of 
the d parameters for each sector, we implement the bivariate selection correction as present­
ed in section 4. Under the assumption of validity of the identification conditions, table 5 re­
ports the bivariate selectivity­corrected earnings equations for public and private sector 
workers, which contain the consistent estimates of the return to knowledge of Catalan in the 
two sectors21. The bivariate estimation of the two selection rules enables us to construct the 
selectivity­correction terms in (5), which have been inserted into the earnings equation as ad­
ditional regressors (eq. 7). Notice that the coefficients’ standard errors have been obtained 
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through bootstrapping22, given that the calculation of the correct variance­covariance matrix 
obtained by Ham (1982) and by Tunali (1986) is cumbersome. 
In general, the estimated coefficients for both sectors are roughly identical to those esti­
mated using the simple Interval Regression Method, and we will not describe them again for 
brevity reasons. Even so, we observe some interesting differences with respect to the previ­
ous estimates, which appear to be worth analysing in more detail. The minor changes in the 
earnings equation estimates are consistent with the reduction in the return to schooling and 
potential previous experience when estimated with the double simultaneous selection correc­
tion. 
Above all, the significant changes concern the estimation of the return to knowledge of 
Catalan in the public and private sectors. Specifically, the apparently higher return to lan­
guage knowledge in the public sector estimated by standard regression methods (i.e. without 
controlling for the endogenous selectivity) seems to be composed entirely by selection­bias 
effects. In fact, when we take into account the selection process behind sector choice and lan­
guage proficiency and the correlation between the two selectivity mechanisms, the return to 
Catalan knowledge for public sector workers is statistically zero. In contrast, the estimated 
return to Catalan proficiency for private sector workers is significantly higher when the two 
simultaneous sources of selection are taken into account, representing almost 13% (≈ exp(d)-
1) of extra monthly earnings23. 
Table 5 
SELECTIVITY­CORRECTED EARNING EQUATIONS (INTERVAL REGRESSION) 
Dependent Variable: Public Private 
Ln(Earnings) sector sector 
Constant 6,35 6,31 
(–27,77) (–116,1) 
Proficiency in Catalan –0,014 0,122 
(–0,14) (–2,59) 
Native­(Catalan Origins) Ref. Cat. Ref. Cat. 
Native­(2nd gen immigrant) –0,043 0,032 
(–1.35) (–1,94) 
Born in the rest of Spain 0,047 0,106 
(–0,73) (–3,01) 
Born in Europe 0,031 0,083 
(–0,21) (–1,5) 
Born in Latin America –0,136 0,059 
(–0.99) (–1,23) 
Born in Africa –0,218 –0,024 
(–2.04) (–0.54) 
Born in Asia or other countries 0,014 –0,004 
(–0,12) (–0.08) 
YMS/10 0,001 –0,018 
(–0,01) (–3.27) 
Female –0,261 –0,31 
(–9.44) (–23.93) 
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Table 5 (Cont.) 
SELECTIVITY–CORRECTED EARNING EQUATIONS (INTERVAL REGRESSION) 
Dependent Variable: Public Private 
Ln(Earnings) sector sector 
Married 0,053 0,074 
(–2,03) (–5,91) 
Years of Schooling 0,054 0,029 
(–6,37) (–9,64) 
Job Tenure (in months)/10 0,01 0,009 
(–8,58) (–11,56) 
(Previous) Experience/10 0,051 0,112 
(–2,57) (–6,08) 
Experience2/100 –0,019 – 
(–4.44) 
Part–time Worker –0,389 –0,438 
(–8.23) (–20,04) 
Union membership 0,078 0,088 
(–2,53) (–6,7) 
#Workers>500 0,055 – 
(–3,73) 
Self–Employed 0,115 – 
(–6,05) 
Living in Barcelona 0,022 0,017 
(–0,81) (–1,21) 
s
e 
0,314 0,337 
r
eu 0,175 –0,188 
(–0,9) (–2.26) 
r
ew –0,194 –0,752 
(–0.95) (–4.15) 
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors (1000 replications). 
Derived z­Statistics appear in italics in brackets. 
Notice also that the correlation coefficients between the unexplained earnings compo­
nent and the error term of the sector choice equation are negative in both equations. This 
shows that an individual who is selected for work in the public sector performs worse than 
a random individual. However, the estimated correlation coefficient is clearly statistically 
significant only in the private sector equation, but not in the public sector equation (proba­
bly due to the reduced sample size). Moreover, the correlation between the earnings equa­
tion’s error term and the unobservable determinants of Catalan proficiency is positive for 
public sector workers and negative for private sector workers. This could indicate that the 
apparently higher language return in public sector may only reflect the fact that those pub­
lic workers who are more likely to be proficient in Catalan are also more likely to earn 
more, and are also more likely to be allocated in that sector; nevertheless, we do not have 
sufficient statistical evidence to argue that this correlation is different from zero for public 
sector workers. In contrast, the significant correlation between the unobservable determi­
nants of language proficiency and unexplained earnings is negative in the private sector, 
suggesting that those individuals whose propensity to know Catalan is largely determined 
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by unobservable determinants of language knowledge earn less than the mean private sec­
tor worker. 
5.4. Robustness Checks 
The evidences presented up to this point indicate that, among the whole employed pop­
ulation in Catalonia, there exists a positive relationship between Catalan proficiency and 
monthly earnings. This association is, apparently, more pronounced in the public sector than 
in the private sector. On the contrary, when the double selection process (Catalan knowl­
edge/sector choice) is taken into account, the language return is null for public workers, 
whereas it is clearly positive for private workers. However, the inclusion of the overall em­
ployed population may generate some concern about the presence of (neglected) individual 
heterogeneity, and its potential effect on the empirical results24. In this subsection we check 
for the robustness of the results obtained, considering three different restrictions regarding 
the sub­sample that has been used for the estimations. 
First of all, we deal with a specific restriction of the database used in the empirical analysis. 
As commented above, the dependent variable used in the estimates consists in (interval­coded) 
monthly earnings, which means that the construction of an hourly wage measure is unfeasible25. 
Moreover, the joint estimation two equations, one for monthly earnings and another for the hours 
of work, together with the complex double selectivity process, introduces additional econometric 
complications. Consequently, we repeat the analysis excluding from the estimation sample all the 
individuals who work less than thirty or more than sixty hours per week (Restriction 1). A sec­
ond point consists with the inclusion of self­employed workers among the group of private work­
ers; indeed, the information about monthly earnings may have a very different meaning for self­
employed workers, and the role of language knowledge might also be different for them. Then, 
self­employed workers are dropped from the estimation sample (Restriction 2). 
Finally, we consider another issue related to the heterogeneity of the language acquisi­
tion process. The idea is that experiencing some pre­migration exposure to Catalan is almost 
impossible for those immigrants who proceed from non­Catalan speaking regions26. This 
means that the language acquisition process of adult immigrants from non­Catalan speaking 
regions is hardly comparable to that of younger immigrants, and of those who were already 
exposed to the language during their childhood (i.e. native­born and immigrants from Cata­
lan­speaking regions). Therefore, we perform all the estimates including only native individ­
uals, immigrants from Catalan­speaking regions and other immigrants who migrated to Cat­
alonia at a (relatively) young age (Restriction 3). Instead of classifying individuals according 
to a fixed age at arrival threshold, we opted for including only those who migrated before 
their potential entry into the labour market (i.e. years since migration > potential experien­
ce27, defined as age –years of schooling– 6). 
The estimates obtained under these three restrictions (separately and jointly implement­
ed) are contained in table 6; for brevity reasons we only report the estimates for the param­
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eter of interest (the return to Catalan knowledge, d) for both sectors, with and without con­
trolling for the double selectivity process28. Consistently with the evidence obtained from the 
baseline specification (i.e. table 3 and 5), the return to Catalan knowledge seems to be high­
er for public sector workers (without considering the joint selectivity). But for each of the 
proposed restrictions, and even with a combination of the three, the estimated return is vir­
tually zero when the two selection rules are taken into account. Moreover, the language re­
turn for private workers is always positive, but higher when the selection correction terms 
are included as additional regressors. In each case, the coefficients’ standard errors indicate 
that the point estimates are not statistically different from the ones obtained using the base­
line specification; however, as expected, the restrictions on the estimation sample generate 
a substantial loss of precision. In sum, these robustness checks suggest that the results ob­
tained are quite stable, which make us more confident about the general evidences regarding 
the economic value of Catalan knowledge in the public –and in the private sector. 
Table 6
 
ROBUSTNESS CHEKS FOR THE RETURN TO CATALAN KNOWLEDGE (d)
 
No selection Selection correction 
N 
d public robust S.E. d public bootstrapped S.E. 
Public sector 
Baseline 0,089 0,04 ­0,014 0,098 829 
Restriction 1 0,115 0,042 0,032 0,096 645 
Restriction 2 0,089 0,04 ­0,002 0,097 829 
Restriction 3 0,091 0,046 ­0,034 0,129 741 
Restriction 1, 2, 3 0,115 0,046 0,012 0,127 576 
Private sector 
Baseline 0,049 0,015 0,122 0,047 4190 
Restriction 1 0,04 0,016 0,09 0,048 3267 
Restriction 2 0,064 0,016 0,102 0,046 3439 
Restriction 3 0,05 0,017 0,084 0,051 3316 
Restriction 1, 2, 3 0,063 0,018 0,116 0,057 2184 
Restriction 1: excluding individuals who work less than 30 hours or more than 60 hours per week.
 
Restriction 2: excluding self­employed workers (only for private sector).
 
Restriction 3: including only native­born individuals, national immigrants from Catalan­speaking regions and
 
other immigrants who migrated before entering the labour market (i.e. years since migration > potential labour
 
market experience, computed as “age – years of schooling – 6”).
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper investigates the economic value of knowledge of Catalan for private and pub­
lic sector workers in Catalonia. The descriptive evidence and the results from a simple esti­
mation indicate that, apparently, the earnings return to being able to speak and write Catalan 
(our measure of linguistic proficiency) is positive in both sectors, but is significantly higher 
for public workers. However, following the main literature, we argue that both knowledge 
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of Catalan and the decision to work in the public or in the private sector are choice variable; 
this represents a double selectivity process, which must be taken into account in order to ob­
tain a consistent estimate of the return to Catalan proficiency in the two sectors. In addition, 
in accordance with the Catalan institutional setting, we enable the potential correlation of 
these two selection rules, which we control for by implementing a double simultaneous se­
lection correction of the earnings equations. 
Once this complex self­selection process is taken into account, the results are complete­
ly different and are consistent with our ex-ante expectation. Specifically, on the one hand, 
the return to knowledge of Catalan is virtually zero for public workers when we control for 
selection on observable and unobservable into proficiency and sector choice, as well as for 
the significant positive correlation between the unobservable determinants of the two selec­
tivity rules. On the other hand, when allowing for the double simultaneous selection process 
the return to Catalan proficiency in the private sector is still positive and is significantly 
higher (rising from 5% up to 13% of extra monthly earnings). These results suggest that 
there is no productivity effect of knowledge of Catalan among public sector workers, and 
that the positive economic value of language proficiency consists only in a higher chance of 
being selected into that sector. 
In contrast, Catalan proficiency seems to increase productivity for private sector work­
ers (assuming the correspondence between earnings and productivity), given that we obtain 
a positive earnings premium even controlling for the double simultaneous selection. In more 
detail, we found that the return to language proficiency in the private sector is underestimat­
ed using a standard regression, because of the presence of negative selection effects; first, 
the propensity to be proficient in Catalan and the likelihood of working in the private sector 
are clearly negatively correlated. Second, the private sector workers who are more likely to 
be selected in the public sector perform worse than a random private sector worker. Third, 
those individuals who are more likely to be proficient in Catalan (keeping the observable de­
terminants of language knowledge fixed) tend to earn less than a random individual. Espe­
cially with respect to the third point, it is quite likely that this negative selection of proficient 
workers may operate through occupational choices –i.e. private workers who are more like­
ly to be proficient in Catalan because of their unobserved language determinants are also 
more likely to be selected into low­paid occupations than others. 
Indeed, potential caveat of this work is that it neglects the role played by the type of oc­
cupation and its interrelation with language proficiency, in the spirit of Aldashev et al. 
(2009). However, we consider that occupation­type selection is a less relevant issue for es­
timating the return to knowledge of Catalan, because we believe and assume that education, 
and not Catalan proficiency, is the main channel for entering high­skill occupations. In other 
words, highly educated individuals may manage to enter highly­paid occupations with or 
without being fluent in Catalan (e.g. in multinational firms where English is the main lan­
guage spoken). In contrast, low­educated individuals are precluded from entering highly­
paid and high­skill occupations, regardless of their functional knowledge of Catalan. Even 
so, occupational components may account for some part of the estimated productivity effect 
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for private sector workers; therefore, extending the selection process to a potential occupa­
tional selection for private sector workers would be an interesting issue for future research 
into the economic value of knowledge of Catalan in the labour market. 
In any case, the global results show the existence of a positive economic value of the 
knowledge of Catalan. Even though we still need to clarify whether the positive estimated 
value for private sector workers corresponds to a productivity effect or to an occupational ef­
fect, it is clear that knowledge of Catalan only represents a selection effect in the public sec­
tor –i.e. Catalan proficiency does not increase productivity of public sector workers. Defi­
nitely, this result questions the strict regulation and the high requirements of knowledge of 
Catalan in the Catalan public sector. On the one hand, it seems that after accounting for self­
selection linguistic proficiency is not associated with higher productivity of public sector 
workers, and merely represents a requirement for being hired in that sector. On the other 
hand, the results also indicate that the probability of being proficient in Catalan is strongly 
related to individual characteristics, which are also related to labour market success (e.g. age, 
origins, education). This means that, in all likelihood, many disadvantaged individuals are 
prevented from being able to speak and write Catalan because of the same characteristics that 
tend to penalize them in the labour market. As a consequence, the strict regulations on lan­
guage requirements for entering the public sector represent a clear barrier to them, and may 
be responsible for some discrimination in the labour market. In terms of policy implications, 
it is quite possible that lowering the linguistic requirements for working in the public sector 
may generate a positive effect, at least in terms of equity; this is especially true if we con­
sider the historical role of public sector occupation in Mediterranean countries as a social 
safety net. 
Notes 
1.	 In fact, Spanish (or Castilian) is taught as a second language in pre­university education. At university the lan­
guage used is not determined by law, and is established by the professor. 
2.	 With the 1998 Act, private suppliers of public services have been subjected to almost the same linguistic re­
quirements as the public sector. Moreover, the Catalan government has introduced economic incentives for 
“normalizing” Catalan in private firms and stimulating active learning of this language by workers; finally, the 
government also promoted the language through the mass media by introducing incentives in the use of Cata­
lan on radio, TV and also in the newspapers and written publications in general. 
3.	 Moreover, given that the information on language knowledge is habitually self­reported in the surveys, mis­
classification/measurement error is also a problematic issue in the empirical literature which introduces addi­
tional methodological complications; see Dustmann and Van Soest (2001, 2002) for further details. 
4.	 Their work is focused on the Spanish labour market in Ginsburgh and Prieto­Rodriguez (2007), whereas they 
extend the analysis to nine European countries (including Spain) in Ginsburgh and Prieto­Rodriguez (2011). 
5.	 Consistently, individual earnings in the public sector are determined on the basis of educational attainment, 
professional category and seniority. This means that two identical individuals who are working in the same 
occupation cannot be discriminated in terms of earnings on the basis of language proficiency; however, dur­
ing the hiring stage, there may be significant discrimination in favour of the candidate with knowledge of 
Catalan. 
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6.	 The value reported is the mean unemployment rate between the fourth trimester of 2005 and the third trimester 
of 2006. The information is taken from the EPA (Encuesta de la Población Activa, Active Population Survey 
(INE)) for Catalonia. Similar values for the unemployment rate in Catalonia had not been recorded since 1978. 
7.	 We also tried to estimate a Probit model for employment, but it performed very poorly due to the extremely 
low number of zeros (unemployed individuals). 
8.	 Indeed, Rendon (2007) recognizes that an important limitation of his study is due to the Census data that he 
used, which does not permit the estimation of the return to Catalan knowledge in terms of earnings (because 
this information is not reported in the database). 
9.	 This means that we may be estimating the lower bound of the true return to Catalan knowledge; in fact, it is 
quite reasonable to assume that individuals tend to over­report their true language abilities. Therefore, we be­
lieve that individuals who claim to be able to speak and write Catalan have at least an acceptable functional 
knowledge of the language. 
10.	 The information on individual earnings is presented in brackets in the ECVHP06 survey. We adopt the stan­
dard solution of estimating an interval regression (“intreg” command with STATA); anyway, using a contin­
uous earnings variable over the mid­points of each earnings interval yields almost the same results; see table 
1A in the Appendix for more details about the coding of monthly earnings. 
11.	 Another potential explanation for this descriptive evidence could be that public sector workers who speak and 
write Catalan are more likely to work in Local Government Institution, which may earn higher salaries than 
public workers in Central State Institutions; we are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
12.	 Descriptions of each explanatory variable can be found in table 1A in the Appendix. 
13.	 In fact, we consider two similar individuals who differ only with respect to knowledge of Catalan, because one 
of them is fully proficient and the other is not: the former has a clear comparative advantage over the latter for 
entering the public sector, which would mean a higher likelihood of working in that sector (ceteris paribus). 
14.	 Notice that, since the covariance between ePUB1 and ePUB0 is not directly identifiable, the variance­covariance 
matrix has been split into two matrices. 
15.	 Given that the dependent variable is defined in intervals (see table 1A in the Appendix), we use the Interval 
Regression Method that is considered a better approximation for such kind of dependent variables; we thank 
an anonymous referee for this suggestion. In any case, the estimation by OLS using the mid­point of each in­
terval as dependent variable yields almost the same results (available upon request). 
16.	 Please, notice that these earning differentials by origins represent a “ceteris paribus” evidence. The results 
from a model with only origin dummies indicate that immigrants from other Spanish regions tend to earn less 
than native; this differential is progressively reduced once other earnings’ determinants are introduced into the 
model, and reverted once Catalan proficiency is controlled for. This means that a significant earnings gap by 
origin is explained by differences in characteristics that are in some way associated with origins, among which 
language knowledge represents an important element. 
17.	 Notice that, as usually argued in the literature, schooling could be an endogenous variable and its coefficient 
should not be interpreted in causal terms. Even so, we tried to instrument years of schooling using parental ed­
ucation and parental occupational status and the results about the return to Catalan knowledge –the variable of 
interest in this paper– are virtually the same (even controlling for the endogeneity of Catalan proficiency). 
18.	 The coefficient estimate for the quadratic job tenure in both equations and for previous experience in the pub­
lic sector earnings equation are not statistically different from zero and they have been dropped from the equa­
tion. There exclusion does not modify the rest of results. 
19.	 Even so, the negative sign of the interaction (Born in Spain)×YSM indicates that immigrants from the rest of 
Spain are less likely to be proficient in Catalan as the length of their stay increases; therefore, the advantage 
of individuals who were born in Spain with respect to foreigners decreases with time spent in Catalonia. This 
shows that individuals who came from the rest of Spain in the past may have had fewer incentives to learn 
Catalan, since they may well have arrived when the use of this language was still restricted to oral communi­
cation. 
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20.	 We also tried to include the number of children, but its coefficient is not statistically different from zero (a 
common result in the literature); moreover, including or excluding this variable does not modify the overall 
results obtained. 
21.	 Also in this case, we use the Interval Regression Method to better account for the interval­coding of the de­
pendent variable; as before, the results obtained using OLS with the mid­point of each interval are statistical­
ly the same. 
22.	 Specifically, we display the z­Statistics obtained with the Bias­Corrected bootstrapped standard errors, which 
have been computed with 1000 replications. 
23.	 Estimating the return to Catalan proficiency with two independent correction terms yields similar results in 
qualitative terms but, for both sectors, the estimated coefficients are somewhat higher than when we control 
for the correlation between the two selection rules (the results are not shown and are available upon request). 
This means that, to some extent, a part of the positive effect of knowledge of Catalan is captured by its corre­
lation with sector choice, which must be taken into account in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the true 
value of knowledge of Catalan for private and public workers. 
24.	 This analysis is mainly driven by the useful suggestions received by an anonymous referee, which were ex­
tremely appreciated by the authors. 
25.	 In the baseline specification we just control for part­time workers introducing an indicator variable, consider­
ing that it is less likely to be endogenously determined with monthly earnings than the hours of work. 
26.	 That is, it is quite hard to find an individual who acquired some knowledge of Catalan before migrating to Cat­
alonia, with the exception of those proceeding from Catalan­speaking regions (mainly Valencia and the 
Balearic Islands). 
27.	 This definition would also capture the fact that these are immigrants that completed their education in Catalo­
nia; even if Catalan was (still) not the language of education when they moved, the contact with Catalan­
speaker pupils at school facilitates the assimilation of the language and the local culture. In any case, the re­
sults are the same using a fixed value of the age at migration, even with very restrictive thresholds. In fact, 776 
of the 950 immigrants that respect this condition migrated when they were 10 or younger. 
28.	 The rest of estimated coefficients are also very similar to the baseline models and are not described here; the 
complete results are available upon request to the authors. 
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Resumen 
Este artículo explora el rendimiento del conocimiento de catalán en términos de ingresos para los tra­
bajadores públicos y privados. Al hacerlo, se tiene en cuenta un doble proceso de selección simultá­
neo. Se considera, por un lado, la no aleatoriedad de la asignación de trabajadores en un sector o en el 
otro y, por el otro lado, la potencial auto­selección en el dominio del catalán. Además, en la corrección 
de las ecuaciones de ingresos, se tiene en cuenta de la correlación entre los dos mecanismos de selec­
ción. Los resultados sugieren que el supuestamente mayor rendimiento para los trabajadores públicos 
se explica integralmente por efectos de selección, mientras que el conocimiento de catalán tiene un 
efecto positivo y significativo para los trabajadores privados, algo más elevado cuándo se tiene en 
cuenta de los procesos de selección. 
Palabras claves: idioma, elección sector, ingresos, selección simultánea, Cataluña. 
Clasificaciones JEL: J24, J45, J70, C31 
APPENDIX 
Table 1A
 
MONTHLY EARNINGS IN BRACKETS (IN EUROS)_OVERALL SAMPLE
 
Earning intervals 
(in Euros) Freq. % Sample 
Less than 450 111 4,3 
Between 451 and 600 168 6,51 
Between 601 and 900 672 26,03 
Between 901 and 1050 372 14,41 
Between 1051 and 1200 417 16,15 
Between 1201 and 1500 373 14,35 
Between 1501 and 1800 212 8,21 
Between 1801 and 3000 221 8,56 
More than 3000 36 1,49 
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Table 2A
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
 
Public sector Private sector 
Variable 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
SOCIO­DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Age 40,92 10,42 38,72 11,12 
Female (0­1) 0,565 0,496 0,404 0,491 
Married (0­1 for both males and females) 0,59 0,492 0,579 0,494 
Number of children 1,201 1,113 1,146 1,159 
INDICATORS FOR COMPLETED EDUCATION 
No Education­Primary Education 0,058 0,234 0,138 0,345 
Lower­Secondary Education 0,103 0,304 0,261 0,439 
Vocational Secondary Education 0,186 0,389 0,255 0,436 
General Upper­Secondary Education 0,134 0,341 0,173 0,378 
Tertiary Education 0,52 0,5 0,173 0,379 
University: Humanities 0,302 0,459 0,054 0,226 
University: Exact Sciences 0,083 0,276 0,049 0,216 
University: Social Sciences 0,128 0,334 0,069 0,254 
Years of Education 14,52 3,991 11,41 3,805 
INDICATORS FOR INDIVIDUAL ORIGINS 
Native­(Catalan Origins) 0,579 0,494 0,467 0,499 
Native­(2nd gen immigrant) 0,189 0,392 0,213 0,409 
Born in the rest of Spain 0,177 0,382 0,168 0,374 
Born in Eastern Spain 0,017 0,129 0,008 0,087 
Born in Southern Spain 0,06 0,238 0,088 0,284 
Born in Central Spain 0,053 0,224 0,046 0,21 
Born in North­Western Spain 0,008 0,092 0,012 0,108 
Born in North­Eastern Spain 0,039 0,193 0,014 0,117 
Born in Europe 0,01 0,098 0,023 0,151 
Born in Africa 0,017 0,129 0,037 0,189 
Born in Latin America 0,016 0,124 0,066 0,248 
Born in Asia or other countries 0,012 0,109 0,026 0,16 
OTHER VARIABLES 
YSM (= 0 for native­born individuals) 7,572 18,34 8,313 19,07 
Arrived Younger than 10 (0­1) 0,08 0,271 0,08 0,272 
Job Tenure (in months) 158,2 136 103,5 114,5 
(Potential) Years of Previous Experience 8,36 9,097 13 10,63 
Part­time Worker (0­1) 0,116 0,32 0,107 0,309 
Union membership (0­1) 0,811 0,392 0,36 0,48 
#Workers>500 (0­1) – – 0,201 0,401 
Self­Employed (0­1) – – 0,179 0,384 
Speak Catalan with Children (0­1) 0,448 0,498 0,32 0,466 
Complete Normalization (0­1) 0,139 0,346 0,183 0,387 
Partial Normalization (0­1) 0,197 0,398 0,225 0,417 
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Couple Employer (0­1) 0,035 0,184 0,04 0,196 
Father Skilled White­Collar (0­1) 0,115 0,319 0,064 0,246 
Father Skilled Blue­Collar (0­1) 0,104 0,305 0,049 0,215 
Non­labour income (0­1) 0,332 0,471 0,27 0,444 
Living in Barcelona (0­1) 0,258 0,438 0,255 0,436 
Definition of constructed variables: 
Age = mid points of the original age variable collected in intervals (16-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-

35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65).
 
YSM = 2005 minus year of arrival in Catalonia; year of arrival in Catalonia collected in
 
intervals (before 1940, between 1941 and 1945, 1946-1950, 1951-1955, 1956-1960, 1961-

1965, 1966-1970, 1971-1975, 1975-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000,
 
2001-2005).
 
Arrived at 10 or younger* = 1 if the individual arrived in Catalonia at age 10 or younger, 0
 
otherwise.
 
Complete Normalization* = 1 if the individual was born after 1977, and arrived at age 6 or
 
younger if born outside Catalonia, 0 otherwise.
 
Partial Normalization* = 1 if the individual was born between 1969 and 1977 and arrived
 
younger than age 16 if born outside Catalonia, 0 otherwise.
 
Years of Schooling = 4 if the individual has no education, or if he/she has completed only
 
primary education (grouped in the original database); 7 for lower-secondary uncompleted;
 
8 for lower-secondary completed; 12 for vocational education; 13 for general upper-second-

ary education; 18 for completed tertiary education.
 
Job Tenure (in months) = mid point of the original variable collected in intervals (< 2 years,
 
2 - 5 years, 5 - 10 years, 10 - 15 years, 15 - 20 years, > 20 years).
 
Previous Experience = potential work experience, previous to the current work (age-school-

ing-(job-tenure (in months))/12 -6).
 
*Variables constructed by IDESCAT staff, from the original registers of the survey (maxi­
mum desegregation). 
